Introduction
In recent years, elliptic curves (non-singular cubic curves) have found many applications in public key cryptography. Several RSA-type schemes based on elliptic curves have been proposed (cf. [2, 7, 5] ). Instead of elliptic curves, three RSA-types schemes have been proposed which are based on singular cubic curves (cf. [4, 8, 6] ). In all these schemes, two plaintext messages m x and m y are used to form a point M = (m x ; m y ) on a singular cubic curve of a predetermined type over Z=nZ. The ciphertext is then a point C = eM on the same curve. In this paper, we show that these three schemes are insecure if a linear relation is known between two plaintexts.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains general facts about singular cubic curves over ÿnite ÿelds F p and the rings Z=nZ. Section 3 describes the three RSA-type schemes which are based on singular cubic curves modulo n. In Section 4, we show that the three schemes are equivalent to each other. Section 5 contains the This work was funded by grant number RP 960668=M.main theorem which gives the formula for the division polynomials on singular cubic curves. Finally, we give a detailed description of the attack in Section 6.
Singular cubic curves
In this section, we discuss some basic facts about singular cubic curves over the ÿnite ÿeld F p and the ring Z=nZ, where n = pq is the product of two distinct odd primes greater than 3.
Consider the congruence
We use C p (a; b) to denote the set of all solutions (x; y) ∈ F p × F p to (1), excluding the point (0; 0), but including a "point at inÿnity", denoted by O. The curve C p (a; b) is called a singular cubic curve over F p . It is well known that the same addition laws deÿned by the chord-and-tangent method in the case of elliptic curves still hold in the case of singular cubic curves [9] . For any point P on C p (a; b), the sum P + O is, by deÿnition, equal to P, which is also equal to O + P. For P = (x 0 ; y 0 ), we deÿne −P as the point (x 0 ; −y 0 − ax 0 ). The sum P + (−P) is deÿned to be O. For P 1 = (x 1 ; y 1 ) and P 2 = (x 2 ; y 2 ) with P 1 = −P 2 , the sum P 1 + P 2 = (x 3 ; y 3 ) is calculated as follows:
The existence of such addition laws makes C p (a; b) a ÿnite abelian group. In fact, the group structure of C p (a; b) is known. Consider the quadratic congruence
and let ; ÿ ∈ F p 2 be the roots of (2). We have that ; ÿ ∈ F p if and only if ((a 2 + 4b)=p) = 1. For a; b as in (1), suppose further that a 2 + 4b ≡ 0 mod p. Let L p (a; b) be deÿned as follows:
Then it is well known that L p (a; b) is a cyclic group and that there is an isomorphism (cf. [9] )
where = ÿ + a=2 so that 2 = (a 2 + 4b)=4 mod p. The inverse of the map (3) can be described as follows. An element of L p (a; b) may be written in the form of f + g with as above, f; g ∈ F p and f 2 − 2 g 2 = 1. This element is sent by the inverse map to the point (x; −
When n = pq is the product of two distinct primes greater than 3, we consider similarly the congruence
We denote by C n (a; b) the set of solutions to (4) in Z=nZ × Z=nZ, excluding those points which are either congruent to (0; 0) modulo p or congruent to (0; 0) modulo q, but including a "point at inÿnity". By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, C n (a; b) is isomorphic as a group to C p (a; b) × C q (a; b). The curve C n (a; b) is called a singular cubic curve over Z=nZ.
RSA-type schemes based on singular cubic curves
Three RSA-type schemes have been proposed which are based on singular cubic curves modulo n.
Scheme 1 [8]
This cryptosystem is based on the singular cubic curve of the form
where n = pq is the product of two large primes. The (public) encryption key e is chosen such that gcd(e; N n ) = 1 where
Encryption: Given a plaintext M = (m x ; m y ), the sender ÿrst computes
then the ciphertext is computed as C = eM on the singular cubic curve C n (0; b).
Scheme 2 [4]
This cryptosystem is based on the singular cubic curve of the form C n (a; 0):
where n = pq is the product of two large primes. The (public) encryption key e is chosen such that gcd(e; N n )= 1 where
then the ciphertext is computed as C = eM on the singular cubic curve C n (a; 0).
Scheme 3 [6]
Encryption: Given a plaintext M = (m x ; m y ), the sender chooses ∈ (Z=nZ) * randomly, and computes
then the ciphertext is computed as C = eM on the singular cubic curve deÿned in Eq. (7).
Equivalence of the three schemes
In this section, we will show that all the three schemes described above can be reduced to one scheme, namely, Scheme 1.
Reduction of Scheme 2 to Scheme 1
The following change of variables (x; y) → x; y + a 2 x will transform the curve C n (a; 0) to the curve C n (0; b) with b = a 2 =4. Using this transformation, one can reduce Scheme 2 to Scheme 1.
Reduction of Scheme 3 to Scheme 1
The following change of variables (x; y) → x; y − + ÿ 2 x will transform the curve
to the curve C n (0; b) with b = (( − ÿ)=2) 2 . Using this transformation, one can reduce Scheme 3 to Scheme 1.
Division polynomials on singular cubic curves
To carry out the attack on RSA-type schemes based on singular cubic curves, we need to introduce the notion of division polynomials on singular cubic curves, similar to the notion of division polynomials on elliptic curves (see [9] ). They allow us to compute the multiple of a point in terms of the ÿrst coordinate. Since we have shown that both Schemes 2 and 3 can be reduced to Scheme 1, we will only describe the division polynomials for the singular cubic curves of the form C n (0; b). Proof. To prove this formula, we ÿrst note that the rational function x(mP) has poles at those points T such that mT = O, with multiplicity 1. Since (0; 0) is not a point on the curve C n (0; b), x(mP) is never equal to zero. Hence the rational function x(mP) must be of the form
where k m is a constant independent of x and F m (x) is the polynomial deÿned by
We ÿrst claim that k m = 1. By a straightforward computation, it is not di cult to see that x(mP) can be expressed in the form
where m (x) = x • for m even, all factors in the product occur with multiplicity 2 except those T for which 2T = O. However, note that
Hence F m is a perfect square as a polynomial in x; y. In other words, there exists a polynomial ' m (x; y) satisfying F m (x) = ' m (x; y) 2 for each m. We shall prove that ' m (x; y) is the mth division polynomial for C n (0; b). For m = 1; 2; 3; 4, we can easily verify that
F 2 (x) = (2y) 2 = 2 (x; y) 2 ;
F 4 (x) = x 10 (4y(x + 2b)) 2 = 4 (x; y) 2 :
So far, we have proved that m (x; y) = ' m (x; y) if m64. We shall now prove by induction on m that indeed m (x; y) = ' m (x; y) for m¿1. Suppose we have proved that m (x; y) = ' m (x; y) for m6m 0 . Let m be an integer with m + 26m 0 . Consider the rational function x − x(mP).
• It has poles exactly at the zeros of 2 m , with the same multiplicity 2.
• It has zeros at those points T such that mT = ±T i.e., (m ± 1)T = O:
These points have multiplicity 1. By comparing the coe cients of the leading terms, we conclude that
By the above formula and induction, we then get
Note that m+2
where p(x); q(x) are polynomials in x and x does not divide q(x). Clearly, 2m+1 (x) q(x) = x m p(x) By using a similar argument on the rational function x((m +1)P) − x((m − 1)P), it is straightforward to prove that 2m = ' 2m . This completes the proof of our theorem.
Detailed description of the attack
To illustrate the attack, we shall only focus on the ÿrst coordinate. Let x(M 1 ) = m x and x(M 2 ) = m x + be the x-coordinates of two plaintexts M 1 and M 2 , and let c 1; x and c 2; x be the x-coordinates of the two corresponding ciphertexts C 1 = eM 1 and C 2 = eM 2 , respectively. Recall that is a known constant. By the previous theorem, we have for the curve C n (0; b) on which M 1 and C 1 lie. The function m is deÿned analogously for the curve on which M 2 and C 2 lie. This relation allows us to construct the following attack.
(1) Let F(x) and G(x) be polynomial over the ring Z=nZ, deÿned by
G(x) = (x + ) e − c 2; x e (x + ; ·):
We compute H (x) = gcd(F(x); G(x)), the gcd of F(x) and G(x) over the ring Z=nZ, which is with a very high probability, a polynomial of degree 1. Solving the polynomial H (x) in x will give the value of m x . Although this attack is similar to that proposed in [3] , it should be noted that, unlike the elliptic curve case where the polynomials F(x) and G(x) are of degree e 2 , our attack involves only polynomials of degree e and is therefore much more e cient. Let F(x) = x 11 + 5229989x 10 + 3440216x 9 (F(x) ; G(x)) = 6975550+x. Solving, we get x = 54321.
Conclusion
We have shown that the RSA-type schemes in [4, 6] are special cases of that in [8] . Moreover, we have described an attack on the scheme in [8] (and hence those in [4, 6] ) when the x-coordinates of the plaintexts are related by a known linear relation. Our attack uses polynomials of degree e (which is the same as in the case of the classical RSA (cf. [1] )) as compared to the elliptic curve case which needs polynomials of degree e 2 .
In [1] , the following generalizations were discussed: (i) when the number of messages involved could be more than 2; and (ii) when the messages are known to be related in some ways more complicated than a linear relation. It is easy to see that our above attack could be modiÿed to accommodate these generalizations. In all cases, as a result of the Theorem above, the complexity of the algorithms for the attacks on the singular cubic curve schemes is the same as those for the classical RSA schemes, which is in turn more e cient than the corresponding attacks on the RSA-type schemes based on elliptic curves.
